14

human animals, are not only distinct in principle from, while yet always
partially involving, things, but also (what is far from evident and indeed quite
surprising) that objects actually presuppose signs in order to be objects in the first
place, and presuppose signsto be sure, but also for science and all the humanities, wherein the split
between nature and culture, inner and outer, is no longer the last word, because
the quasi-error of the external world has finally been laid to rest, and with it
modern philosophy. We are, as it were, in a position to say to the epoch of
modernity in philosophy what the early moderns said so emphatically to the
epoch of medieval thought: Requiescat in pace. A postmodern humanism based
on the notion of semiotic animal will be one deeply rooted in the Thomisticto be sure, but also for science and all the humanities, wherein the split
between nature and culture, inner and outer, is no longer the last word, because
the quasi-error of the external woklgfh;lsldfgldslgvlsadglv'lrld has finally been laid to rest, and with it
modern philosophy. We are, as it were, in a position to say to the epoch of
modernity in philosophy what the early moderns said so emphatically to the
epoch of medieval thought: Requiescat in pace. A postmodern humanism based
on the notion of semiotic animal will be one deeply rooted in the Thomistic

to be sure, but also for science and all the humanities, wherein the split

between nature and culture, inner and outer, is no longer the last word, because

the quasi-error of the external world has finto be sure, but also for science and all the humanities, wherein the split

between nature and culture, inner and outer, is no longer the last word, because

the quasi-error of the external world has finally been laid to rest, and with it

modern philosophy. We are, as it were, in a position to say to the epoch of

modernity in philosophy what the early moderns said so emphatically to the

epoch of medieval thought: Requiescat in pace. A postmodern humanism based

on the notion of semiotic animal will be one deeply rooted in the Thomistically been laid to rest, and with it

modern philosophy. We are, as it were, in a position to say to the epoch of

modernity in philosophy what the early moderns said so emphatically to the

epoch of medieval thought: Requiescat in pace. A postmodern humanism based

on the notion of semiotic animal will be one deeply rooted in the Thomistic

human animals, are not only distinct in principle from, while yet always
partially involving, things, but also (what is far from evident and indeed quite
surprising) that objects actually presuppose signs in order to be objects in the first
place, and presuppose signs no less in order subsequently to be distinguished
from things in the course of experience.22
20 This failure, philosophically at least, is the essence of nominalism, as it turns out.
But that is another story: see Deely 2001: esp. Chaps. 8–10 & 15.
21 The interpretant is distinct in principle from an interpreter, even though, like
objects and things, the two may happen to coincide. Thus, in the more obvious cases,
representation is mad to a person or co no less in order subsequently to be distinguished
from things in the course of experience.22
20 This failure, philosophically at least, is the essence of nominalism, as it turns out.
But that is another story: see Deely 2001: esp. Chaps. 8–10 & 15.
21 The interpretant is distinct in principle from an interpreter, even though, like
objects and things, the two may happen to coincide. Thus, in the more obvious cases,
representation is mad to a person or co