07

In this way it can be seen that objects, normally confused with things by
human animals, are not only distinct in principle from, while yet always
partially involving, things, but also (what is far from evident and indeed quite
surprising) that objects actually presuppose signs in order to be objects in the first
place, and presuppose signs no less in order subsequently to be distinguished
from things in the course of experience.22
20 This failure, philosophically at least, is the essence of nominalism, as it turns out.
But that is another story: see Deely 2001: esp. Chaps. 8–10 & 15.
21 The interpretant is distinct in principle from an interpreter, even though, like
objects and things, the two may happen to coincide. Thus, in the more obvious cases,
representation is mad to a person or cognizing organism, but not necessarily in cases